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MULTINATIONAL CONTRACTTING INTO 
AUSTRALIA: THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND CASE 
STUDY DESIGN 
Azmeri Rahman1, Adrian J Bridge1, Steve Rowlinson2 and Tom Kwok1 
1 School of School of Civil Engineering and the Built Environment; Queensland University of 
Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, Queensland, 4001, Australia 
2 Department of Real Estate and Construction, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
In response to the need to leverage private finance and the lack of competition in 
some parts of the Australian public sector infrastructure market, the Australian 
Federal government has demonstrated its desire to attract new sources of in-bound 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational contractors. This study aims to 
update progress towards an investigation into the determinants of multinational 
contractors’ willingness to bid for Australian public sector major road and bridges. 
This research deploys Dunning’s eclectic theory for the first time in terms of in-bound 
FDI by multinational contractors into Australia. Elsewhere, the authors have 
developed Dunning’s principal hypothesis to suit the context of this research and to 
address a weakness arising in this hypothesis that is based on a nominal (yes or no) 
approach to the ownership, location and internalisation factors in Dunning's eclectic 
framework and which fails to speak to the relative explanatory power of these factors. 
The authors have completed a first stage test of this development of Dunning's 
hypothesis based on publically available secondary data, in which it was concluded 
tentatively that the location factor appears to have the greatest explanatory power. 
This paper aims to present, for the first time, a further and novel development of the 
operation of Dunning's eclectic paradigm within the context of multinational 
contracting, as well as a preview of the design and planned analysis of the next 
empirical stage in this research concerning case studies. Finally, and beyond the 
theoretical contributions expected, other expected contributions are mentioned 
concerning research method and practical implications.  
Keywords: Australia, eclectic paradigm, multinational contractor, road and bridge 
sector 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Runeson and de Valence (2008) observed 
the emergence of a two-tiered construction market comprising the more traditional 
local market and a new global construction industry. This new global construction 
industry is based on high technology and a business strategy revolving more around 
value for money throughout the project's life cycle and is fuelled to a significant 
extent by procurement modes like Public-Private partnerships (PPP). Runeson and de 
Valence (2008) consider that this market is limited in terms of competition and it 
seems reasonable to suspect that this market may have become even less competitive, 
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perhaps towards a duopoly in some sectors and locations - amidst and in the wake of 
the GFC. In Australia and amidst concerns on the issue of a lack of competition, the 
Federal government has noted its desire to see new foreign construction entrants into 
the Australian public sector major infrastructure market (Infrastructure Australia 
2011). Based on this background, an investigation into the determinants of 
multinational contractors’ willingness to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure 
projects appears important. This is from both the perspectives of government and 
contractors with an interest in the Australian market - both contractors contemplating 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Australia and those contractors domiciled in 
Australia. More generally, this investigation is of value to any multinational contractor 
contemplating any FDI into any location. 
In pursuance of explaining the determinants of multinational contractors’ willingness 
to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure projects, elsewhere the authors 
summarize the relevance of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of internationalisation 
(Rahman et al. 2010; Rahman et al. 2011a; Rahman et al. 2011b). Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm has remained the dominant analytical framework for accommodating a 
variety of economic theories concerning the determinants of FDI and the foreign 
activities of multinational firms for over two decades (Caves 1996; Dunning 2002). 
Dunning (1989) has explicitly explored the application of his eclectic paradigm to the 
service sector including construction services. Although yet has been little used in the 
context of multinational contracting. Rahman et al. (2010, 2011a) justified the 
consideration of deploying the paradigm to explain in-bound FDI (to Australia) and of 
using the dominant economic theories advocated by Dunning mindful of the nature of 
the study in the context of multinational construction. Dunning (2008: 99-100) notes 
that the principal hypothesis of the eclectic paradigm is “that the level and structure of 
a firm’s foreign value-adding activities will depend on four conditions being satisfied. 
They are: 
1. The extent to which it (enterprise) posses unique and sustainable ownership 
(O) advantages vis-à-vis firms of other nationalities, in  servicing of particular 
markets or groups of markets… 
2. Assuming that condition (1) is satisfied, the extent to which the enterprise 
perceives it to be in its best interest to add value to its O advantages than to sell 
them, or their right of use, to independent foreign firms. These advantages are 
called market internalisation (I) advantages… 
3. Assuming that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, the extent to which the 
global interest of the enterprise are served by creating, accessing or utilizing, 
its O advantages in a foreign location (L)… 
4. Given the configuration of the OLI advantages facing a particular firms, the 
extent to which a firm believes that foreign production is consistent with the 
long-term objectives of its stakeholders and instructions underpinning its 
managerial and organizational strategic.” 
 
Grounded on Dunning’s principal hypothesis, this paper reflects a lack of in-bound 
FDI in a multinational contracting context into Australia (reverse of Dunning’s 
original stated hypothesis and predications) as follows: the more Australian-based 
multinational contractors relative to other multinational possess desirable O 
advantages, the lesser the incentive other multinational contractors have to internalise 
rather than externalise their use (I advantages), the less other multinational contractors 
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find it in their interest to access or exploit them in Australia (L disadvantages), then 
the less Australia is likely to attract in-bound investment by multinational contractors.  
Having reversed Dunning’s principal hypothesis and generalised predications to 
reflect a lack of in-bound FDI pertinent in this study, this paper aims to present an 
update of the further development of the operation of Dunning's OLI factors within 
the context of multinational contracting and within the developed scope of the study. 
Secondly, it previews the design and planned analysis of the next empirical stage in 
this research concerning case studies. 
OLI FRAMEWORK IN MULTINATIONAL CONTRACTING 
This study is delimited to contractors bidding and delivering projects as head 
contractors in a single entity bid or as co-lead/head contractor in a collaborative bid. 
As a result of this delimitation, the further development of the operation of Dunning's 
OLI factors is based on the practical exclusion of the conventional alternatives to FDI 
namely pure export and licence. As these alternatives become muted in light of the 
fundamental peculiarity in multinational contracting in this study and which concerns 
the imperative for the multinational contractor to establish a physical presence in the 
host location - Australia. That is, the multinational contractor is required to commit 
some degree of internalization and FDI (concerning the contractor’s core activity of 
planning, procurement and coordination of on-site construction) if this firm is to bid 
and deliver a major public sector road and bridge construction project in Australia. 
This situation arises mainly out of the immobile nature of construction works; 
government criteria concerning pre-qualification of a contractor before a contractor 
can be being invited to tender; contractual provisions preventing sub-letting of the 
lead contractor’s responsibilities; local and peculiar design and building codes; as well 
as client and supply chain specificity that requires the contractor be in the location and 
engage in on-the-spot interactions with various upstream and downstream players. 
This fundamental peculiarity also has the effect of reinforcing the exclusion of foreign 
portfolio (or indirect) investment, or the transfer of financial capital, for example, 
multinational contractors acquiring less than 50 percent shares of a local contractor. 
Although this indirect investment may yield influence, it stops short of equating to 
acquiring control associated with some degree of internalisation required to bid and 
deliver projects in this study's context. Thus, this study has as its focus on FDI 
comprising entry modes that involve some degree of equity participation on the part of 
the multinational contractors and in new entities designed to bid and deliver projects 
for example, sole or joint venture projects or companies, as well as the entry mode of 
acquiring more than 50 percent of the shares of a local contractor. Beyond this, the 
power of the OLI is highlighted in this study in which the host country Australia is 
lacking an incidence of FDI. That is, the OLI factors can be effectively  deployed to 
explain the level of attractiveness of the host location as an upstream proxy of FDI 
and notwithstanding the actual level of observed FDI, as indicated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 indicates that the I factor occupies a central occupation of the multinational 
contractor in terms of the role it plays in contributing towards determining the 
attractiveness of the host location. As explained previously, however, the I factor is 
initially taken as a given or constant, as some degree of internalisation and FDI is 
required. Thus, the initial focus for the prospective multinational contractor switches 
then to the operation of the O and L factors around an initial given level of the I 
factor. In doing so,   it more accurately estimates the preferred level of internalisation 
required by the prospective multinational contractor if it proceeds to enter the host 
market and commit FDI. More specifically, Figure 1 depicts a number of key moves 
undertaken by the multinational contractor from its initial assessment of the O and L 
factors around a given level of internalisation to the final FDI decision. 
In the first key move, after having assessed its ownership strengths  relative to all 
other multinational contractors (MNCs) around the world (including host and home 
market rival contractors), if the prospective MNC feels it can win a contract to 
construct a major road and bridge in Australia and subject to conducive contextual 
factors concerning motivation and strategic objectives, some further analysis of the 
costs and benefits of doing business in the host location (Australia) is warranted. In 
the second key move, this further analysis of the cost and benefits of doing business in 
the host location(Australia) is likely to include an assessment of institutional distance 
including the affect of home-host induced distances and in particular cultural; 
administrative; geographic and economic distances. These various kinds of distances 
affect the level of investment (set-up costs) in melding the prospective MNC’s 
ownership advantages and capabilities and particularly its institutional advantage (Oi) 
with the host location. On the face of it, and if the host location(Australia) continues 
to remain attractive, then at this point some deeper exploration concerning a more 
detailed estimate of the degree of vertical integration required (mix of internalization 
and coordination of supply chain – subcontractors and suppliers) is warranted.  This 
estimated requirement is peculiar to the prospective MNC. It represents the level of 
control and internalization the prospective MNC feels it would need - to ensure 
delivery of the project outcomes whilst maintaining its reputation and retaining a level 
of returns it would normally require to construct  a major road and bridge project in its 
Figure 1. OLI framework in multinational contracting
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home country. This estimate could involve a greater degree of internalisation than the 
MNC deploys in its home market. Moreover,  the estimation may greater than  the 
host market norm if the MNC assesses the risk of hold-up by local subcontractors and 
suppliers as significant in conjunction with its initial lack of familiarly with the local 
market and possible lack of pipeline of work to check opportunistic behaviour by 
subcontractors and suppliers. As Coase (1937) anticipated, however, too much 
internalization can lead to inefficiencies arising out of bureaucracy costs. These 
management transaction costs are crystallized in the prospective MNC's internalised 
activities. The greater the prospect of these internal/management transaction costs, 
then this is likely to reduce the attractiveness of the host location. More generally, 
Coase (1937) concludes that any changes that improve the management function will 
tend to increase the size of the firm. And indeed, in the OLI framework Dunning and 
Lundan (2008: 126) observe that, "Dramatic reductions in communications and 
transportation costs, combined with the increasing interconnectedness of cross-border 
markets, has resulted in an increase in the number of locations where value -adding 
activities can take place". The key issue to highlight here is that ex ante, or before the 
multinational contractor actually commits any FDI, the research question amounts to 
one of horizontal integration in which the prospect of transaction costs arising 
internally, or hierarchical failure, acts to deter horizontal integration or internalisation 
and FDI in the host market. In the third key move, and in the instance of an 
unfavourable analysis of the costs of doing business in the host country, this host 
market may still be attractive. That is if the favourable analysis of the benefit of 
entering the host country with a desirable level of demand as well as the supply side of 
host market structure (level of competition and level of profits/returns) relative to the 
prospective MNC’s home market and other possible competing host markets for their 
venture. In the fourth key move, and in the face of an unfavourable analysis of the 
costs and benefits of doing business in the host country Australia, this host location 
may once again still be attractive. That is, there may still be entry modes (in time "t") 
that represent an acceptable return/risk profile for the prospective MNC and, in doing 
so, offer an interim step and period in which the prospective MNC is able to develop 
its management capability internally and externally in coordinating the supply chain 
(and eventually shaping the supply chain itself) whilst being protected from 
unacceptable levels of risk of investment losses. Here, the role of competent 
counterparts is crucial and in terms of sharing the responsibilities of the head 
contractor role.  In this instance, the prospective MNC feels that the only viable entry 
is on more of shorter term project-based approach. Then a partnership or joint venture 
mode with an already established local contractor, such that the prospective MNC is 
bidding as a co-lead contractor, as opposed to a single entity wholly responsible for 
the outcomes, may be considered. In the final key move in Figure 1, "t + 1" envisages 
the situation in which the MNC after entering into a host market develops familiarly 
with the host market and may well develop beyond its initial entry mode and shed 
some of its initial internalised activities, as it begins to fashion and shape the local 
market. The fully established multinational contractor's presence with its degree of 
internalization and FDI now become fully observable and measurable. An I factor 
analysis can now be effectively conducted to explain the degree of internalization and 
the extent to which this is attributed to market failure including the deployment of 
independent variables pertaining to Transaction Cost Economics (asset specificity; 
uncertainty; and frequency) on the potential affect of hold-up (Dunning and Lundan 
2008: 117).  And this time, transaction costs arising from hold-up and other kinds of 
external transaction costs and which are potentially observable around the focal 
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transaction/activity, operate to encourage internalization – now that the firm has 
committed to the local market. In other words, “The internalization factor (I) of the 
OLI paradigm explains the firm’s propensity to internalize market failure (Dunning 
and Lundan 2008: 140). In brief and ex post, the question is now one of vertical 
integration and in contrast to the question of horizontal integration above, these 
external transactions costs act to encourage internalisation and not discourage 
internalisation.  
   
In summary, Figure 1 is consistent with Dunning's principal hypothesis and 
generalised predictions mentioned in the introduction, as well as Dunning and 
Lundan's  more recent propositions concerning the more specific  operation of the OLI 
factors (2008: 142-143). Furthermore, Figure 1 includes depicting the I factor in the 
context of this study as playing a key role. This is in terms of the prospect of the 
eventual actual degree of internalisation (vertical integration) in the host market 
casting a long shadow backwards and upstream. This is also influencing the decision 
to enter a market and commit FDI. More fundamentally, however, the degree of 
internalization depends mainly the operation of  O and L factors, including the 
capabilities of the multinational contractor in managing firm versus market 
relationships; existing structure of the market and the availability of competent 
counterparts. Moreover, an I factor analysis is appropriate to the extent that firms have 
entered a market and establish themselves such that the actual degree of internalisation 
and FDI can be observed and measured. In this study, there is severe lack of 
multinational contractors in the host market Australia and hence a lack of data points 
upon which to conduct an effective I factor analysis. Naturally then, this leads to a 
focus on the O and L factors and in terms of host market attractiveness as an upstream 
indicator of likely FDI.In doing so, it is consistent with the essential research question 
in the context of this study concerning ex ante/upstream horizontal integration and not 
the ex post /downstream issue of vertical integration. 
Elsewhere, the authors (Rahman et al. 2011a, 2011b) developed a version of Dunning 
and Lundan's propositions that focus on the O and L factors. These propositions are 
designed to explore the notion that the O and L factors can display different level of 
explanatory power - as depicted in Table 1 and which also seeks to address a 
weakness in Dunning's principal hypothesis that takes a nominal approach. Table 1 
uses a facial symbol to reflect either similarities ordifferences in O attributes and 
illustrates the outcomes from two propositions. That is, by adopting extreme positions 
and observing differences in the range of the reported level of overall attractiveness in 
the host market Australia down the four columns of multinational contractors with 
different O attributes in the same location (Proposition 1) and in contrast to the range 
of the reported level of overall attractiveness in the host market Australia across each 
of the three rows/groups of MNCS with similar O attributes but in different locations 
(Proposition 2), evidence is generated to indicate the relative importance of O and L 
factors vis-à-vis roads and bridges in Australia. Such that, if a greater range in the 
reported level of overall attractiveness in the host market is observed across the rows than 
down the columns, then this indicates that the L factor is more important and has more 
explanatory power than the O factor and vice versa. In terms of helping to reveal the 
relative importance of O and L factors, it is expected that the relative strength of the 
correlation of the O and/or L factors generated from a final Proposition 3 will be 
consistent with the outcomes from Propositions 1 and 2, again vis-à-vis roads and 
bridges in Australia. In the next section, the attention turns to the research approach 
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which begins with a brief overview of the entire research plan designed to test the 
above three propositions. The focus in the next section, however, is on a preview of 
the second stage of the empirical work in this study concerning case studies. 
Table 1: Propositions 1 and 2 
Roads and Bridges in Australia 
(AUD>50million) 
Home 
Country A 
Home 
Country B 
Home  
Country C 
Home 
Country D 
Operating/expressing an 
interest in Australia  
Group 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Operating/expressing an 
interest in Australia  
Group 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Operating/expressing an 
interest in Australia  
Group 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key:  = O advantages in comparison to contractors of other nationalities/local contractors in serving 
the Australian market;  = O advantages and disadvantages in comparison to contractors of other 
nationalities/local contractors in serving the Australian market;  = O disadvantages in comparison to 
contractors of other nationalities/local contractors in serving the Australian market 
PREVIEW OF CASE STUDY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
The research plan comprises multiple methods of data collection and analysis which 
includes three stages. That is, secondary data; case studies; and a survey. The 
secondary data stage and the case study stage concern four home countries, namely 
China; Japan; Spain; and US vis-à-vis the infrastructure sector selected (roads and 
bridges over AUD50 million) in Australia - as the host market. These first two stages 
seek to surface corroborating evidence concerning ownership advantages and location 
advantages to test the first two propositions illustrated in Table 1. Whilst the survey 
stage is designed to assess the extent to which key findings from the secondary data 
and case studies are generalisable globally in pursuance of testing the third proposition 
mentioned above. Engineering News Record (ENR) is used as the basis of a sample 
frame for the survey and upon checking ENR (2010) listing of the world's top 225 
contractors and in conjunction with visiting the websites of these contractors, where 
available, 181 contractors were identified as operating in the transport sector and will 
be invited to participate in the survey. In total, this approach harnesses the relative 
strengths of multiple methods of collecting and analysing data and answers Dunning 
and Lundan's call that "...the firm and national level analysis on the influence of 
institutions on MNE behaviour need to be linked and treated holistically." (2008: 
142). 
The first stage investigation concerning secondary data in the public domain has been 
completed and has started to talk to the relative importance of the O and L factors 
envisaged in Table 1, as reported by the authors (authors' references to be inserted 
post review). On the O factor, it was noted that there are number of contractors from 
the home countries (for example, Acciona from Spain and Fluor from US), that have 
subsidiaries in the sector in Australia but which are not amongst the leading few 
contractors in their home country (ENR 2010). With regard to the L factor an analysis 
was conducted  of its two dimensions concerning risk and return. Risk dimension 
consists of home-host induced culture; administrative; geographic and economic 
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distances and along with home-host induced distance concerning business uncertainty 
and sufficiency of demand to justify risk. ) On the other hand, return reflects home-
host distances pertaining to industry competitiveness as a proxy for profitability and 
using Porter's (1985) five forces model. On the L factor, the secondary data provided 
sound evidence of these distances and displayed strength is assessing the L factor at a 
national level. In summary, the secondary data provided strong evidence that China 
and US represent much greater distances than Japan and Spain with respect to 
Australia as the host country. As such, this suggests contractors from China and US 
may face higher country specific investments (risks) in setting-up operations than 
contractors from Japan or Spain. This analysis of secondary data pertaining to the risk 
dimension in the L factor corroborated observations on the dependent variable (actual 
FDI) showed the much lower incidence of Chinese and US contractors in the 
Australian roads and bridges market.  However, as China and US account for largest 
number of contractors in the 181 contractors that make-up the previously mentioned 
sample frame in this study. Having reviewed the secondary data pertaining to O 
advantages  which comprise mainly contractors’ websites  including company reports 
and financial statements, it was clear that this source of data is, on its own, insufficient 
to develop assessment of the facial symbols in Table 1. Hence, it is insufficient to 
fully test the first two propositions. The conclusions from the secondary data analysis 
are, therefore, tentative and provisional in suggesting that the L factor may have more 
explanatory power than the O factor. In contrast, it's anticipated that the relative 
strength of case studies in the next empirical stage of the research study will be seen in 
terms of the O factor. 
The case study approach comprises two questionnaire instruments to be administered 
face-to-face via interview and the collection of private secondary documents. The first 
questionnaire is designed for local contractors headquartered in Australia and the 
second of these questionnaires is designed for overseas contractors headquartered in 
China; Japan; Spain and US. At the time of writing, both questionnaires are in the 
process of being administered and it is planned to complete the collection of these 
case study data and analysis by end of August 2012. The essential purpose of the local 
questionnaire is to create reference points to facilitate the identification of the facial 
symbols shown in Table 1. That is, a number of local contractors are selected from 
Australia's National Prequalification System (NPS) and comprise three reference tiers, 
namely Upper Tier 1 (UT1); Lower Tier 1 (LT1); and Tier 2 (T2). A set of objective 
measures are used to assess these contractors' attributes and which include attributes 
corresponding to criteria in the NPS, along with other attributes deemed important by 
contractors in terms of winning contracts and identified from the website search in the 
first stage investigation. On each attribute, the three tiers are ranked either 7; 4; or 1 
with 7 equating to the tier that derives the greatest advantage from the attribute 
concerned and 1 equating to the tier that derives the least advantage from the attribute 
concerned. A radar map is then planned to present the three reference tiers and for 
illustrative purposes and hypothetically only this is shown in Figure 2. On each 
attribute, a set of measurements can now be interpolated and to represent the 
remaining points 2; 3; 5; and 6. Such that entire 7-point is created on each attribute for 
comparative purposes with the scores provided by case study contractors 
headquartered in the four home countries. 
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Given that all the attributes are either directly connected to the NPS criteria and 
derived from details from contractors' websites, then all of the attributes are 
considered valuable in terms of contributing towards winning a contract. Beyond this 
valuable variables, the other Resource-Based Theory (RBT) variables concerning 
rarity and costly to imitate are used to assess the extent to which the different tiers are 
leveraging certain attributes to attain either a possible temporary competitive 
advantage or a possible sustainable competitive advantage. That is, in addition to the 
objective measures on the attribute used to rank the three tiers, each contractor in a tier 
is asked to give perceptual responses on 7-point scales in terms of how rare amongst 
their main rivals and how costly to imitate by main rivals are their measurements on 
the attributes and with a score of 5 or above is considered high. This assessment will 
be shown by colour coding either temporary competitive advantage (high rare score) 
or sustainable competitive advantage (high rare and costly to imitate score) either on 
the portion of line from point 1 to 4 and/or point 4 to 7 on any of the attributes where 
one or two of the tiers out of the three tiers on the attribute concerned consider that 
they have a competitive advantage. Such that, this analysis will also show if and 
where/on what attribute(s) the competitive strength of the each tier lies and how much 
this is specific to the local case study contractor or occurring in other contractors in 
that tier. In the process of generating the three local reference radar maps, the local 
questionnaire takes the opportunity to assess perceptions pertaining to Porter's five 
forces model to corroborate secondary data in Stage 1 concerning the risk dimension 
of the L factor. The local questionnaire also includes questions concerning 
internalisation in seeking to generate empirical evidence to test the notion that local 
powerful  subcontractors and suppliers may be a source of competitive for locally 
established head contractors and by inference a deterrent to entryto a new 
multinational contractor (on the issue of horizontal integration) and at the same time, 
some critical subcontractors and suppliers may encourage internalisation by 
established local head contractors (on the issue of vertical integration). 
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Figure 2. Reference radar map of local contractors
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As mentioned, the second questionnaire is designed for overseas contractors. A non-
probability, or purposive, approach is to identifying the case studies and which 
deploys the logic in Table 1. In order to allow the effect of variations in location 
advantages on the overall attractiveness of the Australian market to be most 
effectively observed (looking across the rows in the Table 1), two of the home 
countries with contrasting construction industries are selected from Australia’s region 
(China and Japan), whilst the other two home countries are from outside Australia’s 
region (Spain and US). In order to create the greatest opportunity to observe 
deviations in ownership advantages (denoted by the facial symbol) and to assess the 
effect of variations in ownership advantages on the overall attractiveness of the 
Australian market (looking down the columns in Table 1), three groups of contractors 
will be sought. The contractors in Group 1 (one from each home location) are selected 
on the basis of having the highest levels of overseas revenue in roads and bridges and 
the highest level of connection to Australia. In contrast, Groups 2 and 3 in Table 1 
comprise the most successful (amongst the top half) and least successful (amongst the 
bottom half) of multinational contractors again with reference to overseas revenue in 
the sector in each of the four home locations but not operating in Australia. The same 
attributes targeted in the questionnaire for local contractors are also deployed in the 
overseas questionnaire. Such that a radar map for each overseas contractor can be 
plotted on the reference radar map comprising the three lines for the three tiers of 
local contractors. The symbol  is given to an overseas contractor whose radar map 
falls mostly above the LT1 map and the symbol  is assigned to a home contractor 
whose radar map falls mostly between the LT1 map and the T2 map. The symbol  is 
given to a home contractor who scores at Point-0 on any attribute pertaining to the 
NPS criteria. This contractor is effectively being assessed as unlikely to achieve 
prequalification and win any road and bridge project greater than $50 million in 
Australia. Again, RBT variables concerning rarity and costly to imitate are  included 
in the overseas questionnaire and are designed to allow a more accurate assessment of 
the extent to which the overseas contractor is matching local contractors particular 
sources of competitive advantage. . This questionnaire also reveals whether this  
advantage is peculiar to the overseas contractor or whether there are other contractors 
in the overseas contractors home country that would similarly match local contractors' 
particular sources of competitive advantage This questionnaire also seeks to surface 
the overseas contractor's perceptions of profitability of the Australian market relative 
to its home market using Porter's (1985) five forces model. A very broad question 
concerning the overseas contractor's perceptions of set-up costs or investmentrisks is 
included and designed to provide corroborative evidence to more detailed assessment 
made previously in the first stage secondary data investigation. Again, questions are 
included concerning internalisation to explore the negative effect of transactions costs 
ex ante in terms of deterring FDI and in contrast to encouraging internalisation ex post 
and once the overseas contractor has committed to a market. Finally, a suite of 
questions are included to surface the MNC’s  perceptions of the attractiveness of the 
Australian market relative to other overseas locations in  which  it is currently 
operating and all other competing locations worldwide, along with questions 
concerning the overseas contractor's international business motivation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented for the first in Figure 1 a novel operation of the OLI 
framework in multinational construction. An overview of the entire research plan 
designed to test Figure 1 was given before previewing the next and second stage of 
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empirical investigation concerning case studies. Harnessing the relative strengths of 
the completed analysis of secondary data; cases studies and survey and triangulating 
the outcomes these methods, will provide strong evidence upon which to conclude the 
relative of importance of O advantages versus L advantages in the context of this 
research and which is progress that Seymour (1987) indicated would be very valuable 
and difficult to achieve. The research will also contribute to method. To the authors’ 
knowledge, this will be the first operationalisation, in this context, of the RBT in 
terms of O advantages in the planned case studies and TCE on the issue of risk as part 
of the L factor in the review of secondary data mentioned in this paper. Furthermore, 
the research will yield some very important practical contributions including a global 
map of the relative attractiveness of the Australian market. Moreover, within this map, 
there will indications of the relative competiveness and productivity of indigenous 
contractors. Finally, the research will identify aspects of the location factor that can be 
influenced by government, as well as surfacing any misconceptions of the Australian 
market.  
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